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Hyperbolic Naturalism: Nietzsche, Ethics, and Sovereign Power 
Peter R. Sedgwick 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper addresses whether Nietzsche’s naturalism is best understood as 
exemplifying the principles of scientific method and the spirit of Enlightenment. It does so 
from a standpoint inspired by Eugen Fink’s contention that Nietzsche’s endorsements of 
“naturalism” are best read as hyperbole. The discussion engages with Enlightenment-
orientated readings (Walter Kaufmann, Maudemarie Clark, and Brian Leiter), which hold 
Nietzsche’s naturalism to endorse of the spirit of empirical science and an alternative view 
(provided by Richard Schacht and Wolfgang Müller-Lauter), which holds Nietzsche’s 
“extended naturalism” to be an informing ethos of historically aware thought rather than a 
mere “method.” The ensuing discussion endorses the latter approach in terms that seek to 
take more seriously the implications of Fink’s point about the hyperbolic and figural aspects 
of Nietzsche’s naturalism. I argue that Nietzsche’s naturalism is indeed often hyperbolic and 
figural but that this exaggerated form of naturalizing thought allows insights that invite 
explicit theorization. Turning to an approach suggested by Adorno and Horkheimer, I argue 
that Nietzsche’s exaggeratedly ‘naturalistic’ take on morality is best appreciated as a form of 
disturbing and disruptive political intervention in the dominant discourse of modernity in 
which it overtly situates itself, namely, the instrumentalizing, methodologically fixated liberal 
discourse of scientific Enlightenment. If we approach his thinking in this way, Nietzsche’s 
naturalism serves as a valuable resource for critical reflection on the hegemony of 
contemporary scientific culture. The context for such critical reflection is provided by 
Giorgio Agamben’s work on sovereign power and modernity. Nietzsche’s naturalism, I 
argue, is foremost biopolitical in its implications. These implications invite critical reflection 
  
 
 
on aspects of Agamben’s work; they also, following Agamben’s lead, suggest that we must 
step beyond the fundamental concepts of liberalism. 
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Is Nietzsche’s naturalism best understood as exemplifying the principles of scientific method 
and the spirit of Enlightenment? If not, then what are we to make of its implications? In what 
follows I seek to address these questions from a perspective inspired by Eugen Fink’s 
contention that Nietzsche’s endorsements of “naturalism” should be taken as hyperbole. With 
Fink’s point in mind, I engage initially with Enlightenment-orientated readings offered by 
Walter Kaufmann, Maudemarie Clark, and Brian Leiter. Such readings hold Nietzsche’s 
naturalism to be an endorsement of the spirit of empirical scientific method. Having 
considered significant problems that beset this approach, I turn an alternative view suggested 
by Richard Schacht, which commits us to the rather different view (shared to a large degree 
by Wolfgang Müller-Lauter) that Nietzsche’s “extended naturalism” is concerned precisely 
with the extent to which humans are not mere pieces of nature susceptible to being described 
solely in scientific-methodological terms. Naturalism, comprehended in this way, is more of 
an informing ethos of Nietzsche’s historically aware thought than a strictly adhered to 
“method” that slavishly emulates the empirical sciences. I endorse the latter approach, but I 
do so in terms that seek to take more seriously the implications of Fink’s point concerning the 
hyperbolic and figural aspects of Nietzsche’s naturalistic discourse, which even the “extended 
naturalism” approach underplays. Taking Nietzsche’s hyperbole seriously has significant 
implications for his status as a thinker of Enlightenment and for the political significance of 
his thought. Turning to some relevant passages from On the Genealogy of Morality, I argue 
that Nietzsche’s naturalism is indeed often hyperbolic and figural in its presentation but that 
  
 
 
his exaggerated naturalistic invocations allow us to glimpse insights that point beyond mere 
exaggeration in so far as, if properly acknowledged, they invite explicit theorization. 
Hyperbole and metaphor are not coincidental to the possibility of such theorization. They 
must be counted as being amongst its necessary and enabling conditions and consequently as 
intrinsic to it. Nietzsche’s hyperbolic naturalism, in short, offers theoretical possibilities that 
cannot be arrived at through the mere application of a “method” derived from the paradigm 
of the sciences, or indeed any form of pure “theory.” On the contrary, turning to an approach 
suggested by Adorno and Horkheimer, I argue that Nietzsche’s exaggeratedly “naturalistic” 
take on morality is best appreciated as a form of disturbing and disruptive political 
intervention in the dominant discourse of modernity in which it overtly situates itself, 
namely, the instrumentalizing, methodologically fixated liberal discourse of scientific 
Enlightenment. This political intervention is evident in Nietzsche’s naturalizing imagery in 
On the Genealogy of Morality and, most especially, in his portrayal of the figure of the noble
1
 
as the origin both of evaluative discourse and institutionalized state power. What is important 
about the naturalizing language Nietzsche deploys in these contexts is that it shows more than 
it can simply say. Nietzsche’s imagistic way of thinking, in other words, trumps any view that 
one begins with method and theorizes facts and practices by subordinating them to it. Rather, 
the relation between theory and practice is, in Nietzsche’s texts, an immanent one. If we 
approach his thinking in this way, the naturalistic elements in Nietzsche can serve as a 
valuable resource for critical reflection on contemporary culture rather than contributing to an 
uncritical endorsement of its hegemonic “scientific” ethos. The context for such critical 
reflection is provided by Giorgio Agamben’s work on sovereign power and modernity. 
Nietzsche’s hyperbolic presentation of sovereignty and power reveals the violence inherent in 
both to turn on the fashioning and administration of the naked animality that characterizes 
biopolitical discourse. Nietzsche’s naturalism, I argue, is foremost biopolitical in its 
  
 
 
implications. These implications pose important questions for liberal politics; they are 
questions that, if taken with sufficient seriousness, suggest we must step beyond the 
fundamental concepts of liberalism. 
 
1. Stone 
“Stone,” Nietzsche comments in section 218 of Human, All Too Human, “is more stone than 
before.”2 He is considering architecture. Generally speaking, Nietzsche suggests, we moderns 
are obliged to admit we no longer understand the architecture of the past. Reflection on the 
built environment in which we dwell jars us into confrontation with our own fragmented 
historicity. In the consideration of past architecture, everyday familiarity vanishes. We 
encounter traces of a world made by sensibilities radically other than our own. In noticing 
this, we open ourselves to the discovery that we have outgrown the symbolism and formality 
of lines and figures traced across the contours of ancient buildings no less than we have lost 
touch with the ethos that would render us prey to being affected by out-dated rhetoric. Putting 
things more bluntly, although we dwell alongside structures associated with religious 
sensibility, we cannot draw in from them the kind of educative nurturing that once swelled 
powerfully up to constitute a world charged with the religious. We who believe, however 
hazily, in the power of science can no longer swallow the miraculous as our forebears did. 
Our grasp of the aesthetic is changed by this. The beauty of architectural construction, 
Nietzsche points out, was peripheral in relation to its being the conduit through which the 
holy made itself manifest. All ancient religious buildings and constructs speak of a humanity 
that discovers itself amidst this divinely inspired terror; they stand as bulwarks of 
appeasement to the storms and rages of the angry divinity howling over the heads of a 
humanity powerless in the face of unrelenting nature. At most, their beauty only mediated the 
terror of the godhead that the sublime edifice was built to communicate. We moderns have 
  
 
 
lost sight of all this. “What to us today is the beauty of a building?” Nietzsche asks. His 
answer: it is a façade, “something mask-like” (HH 218). A condition of mask-like beauty 
suggests something frozen and dead. What lies “behind” the beauty of the mask is the 
embodied, unyielding and inorganic stoniness of stone. Even deeming such a world 
“indifferent” to the sphere of human concerns would be asking too much of it by making of it 
something that is too “involved.” We are all “naturalistic” to the extent that we have ceased 
to believe the super-natural lurks behind the world in such a way as to soften its stony 
indifference. 
It is against the backdrop of this distanced indifference even to “indifference” that any 
consideration of Nietzsche’s conception of naturalism needs to be set. Such a world is one of 
interminable suspension; a realm of indefiniteness. A world like this, which has lost all 
determinate “meaning” with which to grasp it as a whole, he notes in The Gay Science, is one 
to which not even the notion of “accident” is applicable any more—never mind notions of 
purpose, life and order, or concepts of substance, matter and the like. In the face of this 
Nietzsche formulates a demand. A new language is needed that will allow us to embrace a 
“de-deified” and hence “redeemed nature” liberated from the “shadows of God” that disturb 
the modern mind. This embrace initiates the moment when we can “begin to naturalize 
humanity” (GS 109).3 
With how much seriousness should we take this urging of a project of 
“naturalization”? Eugen Fink offers one answer to this last question. As a rule, naturalism in 
Nietzsche, he comments, is best taken as “hyperbole, and intentionally coarse hyperbole at 
that.”4 The section from The Gay Science just quoted can be taken as offering good evidence 
for this view. Nietzsche’s language here is full of evocative sentiment, including a quasi-
religious one of redemptive “release [erlösen]” invoking thoughts of salvation. Here, as 
elsewhere, Nietzsche raises many questions concerning how we think about “nature” but at 
  
 
 
the same time says very little about what nature is, or about what a redeemed condition might 
amount to beyond its being one of deliverance. The mode of expression is richly and darkly 
metaphoric, its tone emphatic, yet its object is elusive, conjuring powerful imagistic feelings 
that are not easily translated into definitions. If we were to read this in accord with Fink, then 
we would be forced to admit along with him that the hyperbolic character of this kind of 
naturalizing talk, whatever else it might do, in no way warrants the claim that Nietzsche is 
seeking to “return” humanity to “nature” or deliver it into the hands of those who take 
themselves to be the aspiring masters of nature, i.e. “the natural scientists.” We would, in 
other words, be well-advised to ponder carefully whether Nietzsche’s endorsements of 
naturalism signify a straightforward dedication on his part to anything associated with the 
project of Enlightenment, with its emphasis on liberating humanity from illusion and myth 
through the refinements of technique associated with reason, science and an accompanying 
faith in method. At this juncture, it is useful to set this point in the broader context of two 
significant approaches to Nietzsche’s naturalism.  
 
2. Enlightened Naturalism versus Extended Naturalism 
Although, as has been noted above, much has been made of Nietzsche’s philosophical project 
“to translate man back into nature” (BGE 230), as Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson 
confirm, he “offers rather little in the way of more exact and detailed characterization” of 
what such a naturalistic translation amounts to.
5
 In a manner that effectively endorses the 
existence of grounds for Fink’s suspicions of taking such things too seriously, they admit that 
Nietzsche’s thought lacks (either through deliberate refusal or casual omission) a formal 
definition of naturalism. We are thereby left with the task of amplification. One distinctive 
response to the challenge posed by this task involves welding Nietzsche’s naturalism as 
closely as possible to the paradigmatic conception of enquiry offered by the sciences. Walter 
  
 
 
Kaufmann, in his well-known study, must be counted as being among the first to have 
resorted to endorsing this approach in explicit terms. For Kaufmann, Nietzsche is naturalistic 
in so far as he “began with the assumption that all men were essentially animals, and […] he 
took over this assumption from the empirical sciences.”6 For Kaufmann, this scientifically 
inspired naturalism runs so strongly through Nietzsche’s thinking that it propels his 
philosophical development, forcing the abandonment of the early metaphysics extolled in The 
Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely Meditations and initiating him on the path of thought that 
ultimately leads to the late philosophy of power. 
Kaufmann takes naturalism in Nietzsche to be a “method.”7 This method is 
“experimental” in the sense that, following the paradigm provided by the image of the careful 
scientist working patiently and laboriously at the laboratory bench, each of Nietzsche’s texts 
is envisaged as a multitude of little thought experiments. What is immediately problematic 
about Kaufmann’s reading is that its enthusiasm for the idea of experimental method trumps 
the suspicion of systematic formality that is integral to the tone and argumentation of 
Nietzsche’s writing.8 A lack of systematic, methodical structure is, on Kaufmann’s account, 
Nietzsche’s most profound shortcoming. This lack, Kaufmann claims, leads to Nietzsche’s 
“experiments” being “often needlessly inconclusive.”9 Inconclusiveness renders any 
experiment ultimately pointless since no firm structure of related conclusions can be 
elaborated from it. It follows that Nietzsche’s thought, while “coherent and noteworthy” and 
full of scattered riches, does not culminate in “a great harvest.”10 Nietzsche is thereby 
diagnosed as suffering from a methodological deficiency: his lack of investment in the idea of 
“internal coherence” hampers his best insights. On this reading, Nietzsche is ultimately a 
glorious failure. Kaufmann’s inevitable conclusion is that had Nietzsche adhered to the spirit 
of scientific method more closely in his textual practice he would have realized the 
experimental spirit that motivates his thought more fully and truly. The task of the interpreter, 
  
 
 
as Kaufmann understands it, thereby becomes one of methodological midwife, patiently 
teasing out the experimental structure that Nietzsche would have articulated had he thought 
better about it in the first place. 
Kaufmann’s viewpoint begs questions on two levels. First, the idea that a lack of 
systematicity and “internal coherence” leads to failure is no more obvious than the opposite 
view that Nietzsche expressly advocates. Second, such a criticism presupposes that one 
already knows what success and failure amount to, not least in relation to Nietzsche’s works 
and philosophical project. It presupposes, in short, that had Nietzsche thought better about it, 
he would have wanted to bask in the success ensured by systematically formalizing his 
thoughts according to the dictates of “experiment” and “method.” 
In spite of these obvious reservations, subsequent interpretations of Nietzsche offered 
by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter endorse in more emphatic terms Kaufmann’s 
embracing of the spirit of scientific experimentalism, and in doing so likewise assume that 
Nietzsche’s texts can be decoded and evaluated according to its strictures. For Clark, 
Nietzsche’s late writings11 abandon any earlier radical scepticism and display “a uniform and 
unambiguous respect for facts, the senses, and science.”12 Nature, in other words, is for the 
mature Nietzsche best understood as the world according to the Enlightenment paradigm of 
the factual and the sensuous defined by way of the rigors of natural scientific empiricism. 
Leiter, following Clark’s cue, abandons even Kaufmann’s cautious reservations about 
Nietzsche’s methodological failings. He effectively claims not to be presenting what is latent 
in the spirit of Nietzsche’s thought but to be simply telling us what is already there had we 
the sense to see it.  Scepticism about Nietzsche’s possible shortcomings is abandoned in favor 
of the desire to demonstrate that Nietzsche’s naturalism is “fundamentally methodological” in 
so far as directly it copies the “experimental method” and “styles” of the “successful 
sciences.”13 Nietzsche, in other words, emulates not only the patterns of enquiry offered by 
  
 
 
the sciences but also the scientific stipulation of what genuine “success” amounts to. 
Naturalism, on Leiter’s view, is in this sense implacably opposed to the “postmodernist” 
rejection of the enduring truth of scientific method.
14
 Against postmodernism, Leiter offers us 
a Nietzsche assured of a place within the canon of natural scientific “philosophers of human 
nature.”15 He interprets Nietzsche’s naturalism as attempting to emulate the causal efficacy 
of scientific explanation in philosophical form. Naturalism becomes method pure and simple. 
This method is taken as the main tool with which Nietzsche conducts his polemic against 
conventional morality.
16
 In this way, naturalism is claimed to offer a causal account of moral 
phenomena that, in so far as it is conducted as a means of establishing a descriptive account 
of “facts about persons,”17 is “fundamentally natural,” in the sense that such an account is 
devoid of any taint of sinister proto-postmodern tendencies. 
Rejecting the idea that Nietzsche might be engaged in a critique of the socio-historical 
conditions and hidden interests underlying moral discourse, Leiter asserts that he is really 
concerned with these interests only in so far as they are taken to be natural (i.e. given) 
scientific facts.
18
 His approach thereby seeks to neutralize any possible historical, social, and 
political aspects that might be attributed to Nietzsche’s treatment of morality by endowing it 
with the aura of the neutrality and respectability that springs from commitment to method.
19
 
The problem with this approach is that, even more than Kaufmann’s, it presupposes 
Nietzsche to have both the same interest in, and conception of, “success” as that which 
motivates scientific method. This approach effectively assumes that if one can find some 
evidence of Nietzsche playing a game that looks like the kind of methodological game that is 
played by the sciences, then that is what Nietzsche must be doing. What is not entertained is 
the possibility that Nietzsche, even when he follows the rule-like stipulations characteristic of 
science, might be playing another game.
20
 In other words, it takes the post-metaphysical 
commitments that Nietzsche clearly and frequently endorses (in the shape of “historical 
  
 
 
philosophy” and genealogy21) to be equivalent to an endorsement of the right of scientific 
method to claim possession of the sphere of critical thought. 
Rejecting metaphysics is one thing, but uncritically endorsing science and its method 
is another. As Richard Schacht has pointed out, it is possible to argue that although Nietzsche 
is committed to the view that we should regard people “as instances of a general type of 
animate existence, the complex nature of which it is the task of philosophical anthropology to 
comprehend,”22 a sensitive elucidation of the naturalism this implies does not have to be 
“wedded to the view that everything that happens in human life […] can be adequately 
explained and fully comprehended in terms of natural-scientific or natural-scientifically-
modelled concepts and processes.”23 According to Schacht, this is especially shown by the 
fact that Nietzsche’s naturalism seeks to come to terms with a significant and puzzling feature 
of human beings, namely, with the fact that they are “disanimalized.” A being that is 
“disanimalized” is an animal, but the animality that pertains to such a being is not “natural” 
since the question of “who” such a being is cannot be answered by simply drawing up a 
descriptive table of natural type facts.
24
 This is another way of saying that Nietzsche is at 
least as interested in culture and history as he is in nature and biology. Indeed, Nietzsche is 
open to being construed as considering them as intimately connected in ways that the causal-
scientific account cannot countenance. Reinterpreting humanity back into nature does not 
simply mean seeking to understand human beings by proffering lists of “natural” descriptions 
(scientific “facts,” or as Nietzsche himself might have called them, labels25). It requires we 
attend to the rather more demanding task of understanding humankind as an animal that is 
biological and yet, at the same time, more than mere biology since it is also its history and 
that history is constitutive of it. In other words, human history, which is a socio-cultural 
phenomenon, has in a decisive way constituted the questions and possibilities that confront us 
in the shape of human identity. What Schacht terms Nietzsche’s “extended naturalism” thus 
  
 
 
involves starting from the standpoint of conceiving of humanity as having emerged from 
nature and subsequently broken with it in a manner that is revealed by our historicality. 
Naturalism, so conceived, obliges us to grasp the subtle insight that although humanity 
springs from, and is organically tied to, nature in so far as we are embodied beings, our 
human world “is no longer merely natural” and cannot be adequately interpreted as being 
entirely such.
26
 
An analogous point is made by Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, who elaborates Nietzsche’s 
desire to translate humanity back into nature in the following terms: “Man’s origin lies in 
nature, and he is not ‘more’ in any qualitative sense, but surely [is ‘more’] in a quantitative 
one. The total organic world lives on in him. And insofar as every inorganic thing is a 
synthesis of inorganic forces, the inorganic also ‘lives’ in him. What is oldest, ‘firmly 
embodied’ in him, is locked in conflict with newer elements. Man contains multiplicity in 
himself and he interprets it.”27 On this view, the naturalistic insight suggests humans are a 
synthesized multiplicity of inorganic and organic elements. Qualitatively speaking, 
humankind has kinship with the organic and non-organic. This kinship denotes an 
interpretative activity in which the synthesizing and overlaying of layers continually 
combines and recombines the most ancient yet persistent of origins with “newer elements.” 
Humankind is hence always already a kind of sandwiched interpretation that stands before 
itself as a synthesis of the non-organic, the organic, of animality, of the prehistoric, and of 
features of more recent provenance. Decisive among such newer elements is the 
“disanimalized” aspect. This aspect is all that is contained with the realm of human history 
and culture: the accumulated mishmash of practices, customs, traditions, observances, etc. 
that fashioned the human animal in the primitive world of the earliest communities in such a 
way as to constitute what is distinctive about it by marking it out as a creature uncannily at 
odds with itself, a being which is simultaneously animal and yet set apart from (and 
  
 
 
consequently also against) the mere fact of its animality.
28
 As such, we are creatures that 
always already discover ourselves as multiplicities of concatenated elements; some of these 
are “natural,” but a good deal are cultural and historical and hence open to being regarded as 
profoundly “unnatural.”29 Naturalism understood in the light of this claim does not involve 
the application of a rigidly prescriptive method associated with the sciences, even though it 
nevertheless springs from an engagement with them. As Müller-Lauter comments, Nietzsche 
approached science with an attitude of informed engagement and careful reflection, in so far 
as he “was constantly aware that the sciences had to be taken critically, that the path of his 
philosophizing had to lead through them […].”30 Going through science is not the same as 
following it. Equally, endorsing it in some ways is not the same as endorsing it unreservedly, 
either with regard to its substantive claims or its methodological commitments. Extended 
naturalism, therefore, seeks to offer an account of Nietzsche’s approach, which, while taking 
science seriously, does not cleave to the more rigid methodological approach advocated by 
Leiter. 
 
3. Hyperbolic Naturalism 
As Schacht and Müller-Lauter show, there are good reasons to take a naturalistic approach to 
imply something different from the mere mimicry of scientific method proposed by critics 
like Leiter. It is not sufficient simply to assert that there are passages where Nietzsche 
appears to extol the virtues of science and method to conclude that always and everywhere he 
is simply following its example.
31
 At the same time, neither a scientific-methodological 
conception nor even a “disanimalized” view of naturalism is immune to Fink’s point about 
Nietzschean hyperbole. If we take Nietzsche to be using overstatement and irony when he 
writes “naturalistically,” then it becomes extremely hard to suggest his “naturalism” refers to 
anything that can be easily separated from the rhetorical function it serves on any specific 
  
 
 
textual occasion in which it is invoked. What one ends up with, in consequence, is a general, 
naturalistic ethos (i.e. a standpoint opposed to super-naturalism) that nevertheless remains 
firmly rhetorical and textual in its implications. Nietzsche’s non-reductive naturalism is non-
reductive in so far as it is irredeemably figural. 
Take, by way of illustration, the first essay of the Genealogy. Here, Nietzsche 
typically offers up a text that problematizes any attempt to disentangle reasoned argument 
and naturalistic exaggeration. A relatively casual and limited survey of just the Genealogy’s 
first essay quickly reveals the extent to which a naturalizing hyperbole of animality, 
processes and affects permeates the discussion in a manner that is not methodical but 
disruptively normative in tone: English psychologists are “frogs,” “animals” (GM I:1); 
ressentiment springs from the “tree” of “Jewish hatred” which “gives birth” to slave values 
(GM I:9 and 10); slave morality is a “poisoning of the blood” and “intoxication” that passes 
through “the whole body of humanity” (GM I:9), as well as an anaesthetic; spiritual hurts are 
“worms” that burrow into the metaphorical body of one’s feelings (GM I:10); nobles are 
“beasts of prey” (GM I:11); the socialized person of culture is a domesticated “pet,” and 
modern humanity a “stunted,” “poisoned,” “teeming mass of worms” (GM I:11). We are also 
invited to enter a darkened “cellar” where values are created by “cellar rats” (GM I:14). 
Nietzsche’s text here plays on the power of naturalizing imagery to make its un-erasable 
mark on the reader, and it would be hard to claim that he is making a point that could be 
easily disentangled from this, never mind endorsing a “method” akin to those of the sciences. 
Such hyperbole, however coarse-grained in its pursuit of polemical effect, is not 
easily dissociated from Nietzsche’s arguments. One of Nietzsche’s central contentions about 
nobles—the beings who are the original coiners of values in their own affirmative self-
image—demonstrates this entanglement clearly enough. Nobles, Nietzsche suggests, are 
aggressive cultural beings who have been subjected to processes of socialization. Policed by 
  
 
 
the severe norms of their own social order (norms they strictly observe with regard to one 
another, as all well-behaved communal people must if the community is to survive—a 
contention that apparently draws on naturalistic, Darwinian premises), such beings strain 
against the feelings of containment that the carefully fenced boundaries of peaceful 
communal life foster. Release from these constraints happens when the noble steps outside 
the bounds of the community and traverses cultural domains. This release uncorks pent-up 
and violent energies, which the nobles discharge on populations situated in other social orders 
that are “strange” and “alien” to them. The noble, in other words, is envisaged as 
unconsciously seeking gratification in compensation for the cost of internalizing the 
inhibitions that social life necessitates.  Desire for such gratification is expressed as a craving 
for victims. When this craving is allowed expression, acts of violation ensue. Such violation, 
Nietzsche is at pains to point out, is carried out with the innocent “good conscience” 
characteristic of a merciless and lawless predator that, in the absence of constraint, suddenly 
feels itself incapable of doing any wrong (GM I:11). The effect of Nietzsche’s “naturalistic” 
sketching of the noble is deliberately disturbing precisely in relation to what the image of his 
or her instinctive and joyous violence invokes. These unharnessed semi-animals (Nietzsche’s 
notorious “blonde beasts”) become creatures of the hinterland. They occupy an uncanny 
space between culture and nature since they are neither exactly human in their predatory 
exultation nor wholly animal due to their being, at the same time, complex social animals. 
Nietzsche’s exaggerated “description” communicates vividly what no mere theory 
(Darwinian or otherwise) can: the irreducibly disturbing identity that bursts out of the human 
visage when it assumes the look of barbarity that is only possible in relation to the subjection 
characteristic of civilization. The nobles’ violence is a mirroring and inversion of the social 
violence of containment and control from which they are constituted as persons in the first 
place. That persons of this near bestial kind are also asserted to be the inventors of morality 
  
 
 
(of “good and bad” talk and, in the shape of the priest, “good and evil” talk) is a claim 
calculated to overturn all “civilized” ideas of moral order. That the idea is offered up in 
exaggerated, imagistic form is not coincidental to its content. The violent hyperbole of the 
text is itself a refined and carefully executed enactment of the intimate connection between 
culture and barbarism that it asserts. Naturalism, in this sense, is never natural. It is cultural 
violence writ large, insofar as a “pure” nature could never meaningfully be deemed “violent” 
or otherwise. Nietzsche, even in a late work like the Genealogy, thereby never steps into the 
realm of a “redeemed” nature of the kind invoked in section 109 of The Gay Science. 
The “naturalistic” account of the noble as the source of value is meant to disturb and 
unsettle. But Nietzsche wants to shock us further. Nobles are not merely semi-wild 
barbarians. As the text of the Genealogy unfurls, it turns out that, as the first organizers and 
overseers of the form of the state, they are also born administrators. It is nobles who, in the 
second essay of the Genealogy, the reader witnesses descending on their victims not as mere 
plunderers but as colonizers, assuming suddenly the form of “a conqueror and master race 
which, organized on a war footing, and with the power to organize, unscrupulously lays its 
dreadful paws on a populace which, though it might be vastly greater in number, is still 
shapeless and shifting” (GM II:17). From the standpoint of their victims, such terrible beings 
simply appear: they are “there” just as lightning is “there”—in a flash, without “cause” or 
“reason” to explain or justify their sudden arrival and violent imposition of will. Nietzsche 
thereby moves in the text of the Genealogy between the naturalized wilderness of the spaces 
separating primitive communal orders, which can be crossed and plundered, to the 
constrained and defined space of organization of the political state through a vivid invocation 
of acts of seizure and possession. Sovereignty is in this way portrayed as being rooted in an 
original act of cultural (rather than “natural”) violence. That the origin of state power thus 
conceived is profoundly illiberal hardly needs commenting on, although Nietzsche cannot 
  
 
 
resist: “I think we have dispensed with the fantasy that it began with a ‘contract.’” That such 
naturalized violence is held too easily to be “creative,” in that the state emerges in a welter of 
unconsciously creative “hammer blows” raining down on a crude population that is malleable 
and so susceptible to the strokes of wild “artists” who wield the most violent force, ought to 
give us reason to pause. With this, the Genealogy has not merely asserted the fundamental 
conjunction of the pairings “nobility-morality” and “nobility-sovereignty,” thereby 
challenging the assumptions that what are subsequently deemed “good” and “legitimate” 
originate in the virtues of selflessness and fair-handedness. Nietzsche has, at the same time, 
articulated a profound link between nature, culture, violation, power, subjection, political 
organization, and identity. He has effectively asserted that this chain of links constitutes the 
formative condition of political life. Nietzsche, in short, has, in the course of his violently 
naturalizing, deeply speculative (to the point of being fictional) and over-stated narrative, 
conjured up the image of sovereign power as alienating organization and containment. 
“Naturally,” the text implies with a degree of irony possible to suspect but impossible to 
measure, such sovereign power produces resentful feelings, just as “lambs bear a grudge 
towards large birds of prey” (GM I:13). Sovereignty, that in the end gives rise to law, fairness 
and justice, is in its origins fundamentally and paradoxically as blameless as it must initially 
be lawless, unfair, and unjust. Sovereignty’s violent origins cannot be held accountable, just 
as there “is no reason to blame the large birds of prey for carrying off the little lambs,” since 
accountability only emerges with the law that sovereign violation of the communal victim 
makes possible. 
As I have hinted, Nietzsche’s apparently indifferent irony is more complex and hard 
to define than it might initially appear to be. As section 13 of the Genealogy’s first essay 
unfolds, the naturalizing language used extends beyond characterizing noble and victim to a 
discussion that traverses considerations of free will and identity before engaging in critical 
  
 
 
reflection concerning moral responsibility and the adequacy and authority of descriptive 
scientific language. In this eccentric traversal, rather than conforming to the conventional 
demands of systematic argument and consistency that the topic might be assumed to require, 
Nietzsche’s thinking remains permeated by the ambiguous imagistic and hyperbolic aspects 
that propel it. Although he generally rejects all talk of oppositions as metaphysical,
32
 here 
Nietzsche unhesitatingly allows the “natural” rhetorical effect of naturalistically presented 
opposition to do the work for him as he denies the moral accountability of the primitive 
aggressor: “It is just as absurd to ask strength not to express itself as strength, not to be a 
desire to overthrow, crush, become master […] as it is to ask weakness to express itself as 
strength.” (Naturally…) weakness cannot become its opposite, any more than strength can 
become what it is opposed to, namely weakness. (Naturally…) the strong must vent their 
strength on the weak. They cannot do otherwise, for there is no “indifferent substratum 
behind the strong person which has the freedom to manifest strength or not.” The doer and 
the deed are one and the same thing: “there is no ‘being’ behind the deed, its effect and what 
becomes of it; the ‘doer’ is invented as an afterthought,—the doing is everything” (GM I:13). 
Life, in other words “nature,” is essentially and exclusively activity—life is expression of 
strength and its affects. As soon as one ignores this and embraces a world of doers separate 
from deeds, one thinks unnaturally and metaphysically: “The [natural] scientists 
[Naturforscher] do no better when they say ‘force moves, force causes’ and such like […] all 
our science […] still stands exposed to the seduction of language and has not ridded itself of 
the changelings foisted upon it, the ‘subjects’ (the ‘atom’ […] for example […])” (GM I:13). 
The figure of the natural scientist is thereby suddenly inserted into the midst of a domain 
populated by talk of origins, imagery of eagles slaughtering lambs, patterns of drives and 
affects, to be accused of metaphysical and moral naivety in its endorsement of the 
  
 
 
anthropomorphic “I.”33 Can any reader not be left wondering how he or she was transported 
to such a surprising conclusion? 
One can address to this last question in the following terms.  In its refusal to adhere to 
conventions of argument the exaggerated naturalizing critique offered in section 13 of the 
Genealogy’s first essay reveals more than it ought initially to be able to say, given where it 
started. What it says is only expressible through a traversal that encloses in an apparently 
seamlessness circle a range of heterogeneous discursive fields: origins (the historicization of 
values), victim and prey, speaking animals (anthropomorphism, fictional narrative of 
struggle), force (units of power), drives (biology), will and action (embodiment), mythical 
agency (the “subject,” “freedom”), lightning (energy of inorganic nature), strength and 
weakness (power of the organic), science (cognitive discourse, “knowledge”), the founding 
errors of reason (metaphysics), the need to blame (ressentiment). This naturalizing conflation 
does not argue its case directly. Indeed, it is marked by a rigorous refusal to argue. Rather, 
what Nietzsche does is to show us something about the limitations of moral and cognitive 
discourse by blending together the methodologically discontinuous discursive fields of 
organic and inorganic, power and selfhood, reason and unconscious behavior in a stream of 
concept-images that are paradoxically conceptually disruptive and confusing and yet vivid in 
what they seek to communicate. Nietzsche manages to convey the idea that the cognitive-
descriptive discourse of the sciences, precisely in its aversion to the exaggeration and 
violence enacted by rhetoric, that is, in its acceptance of the notion of a neutral and unbiased 
“subject,” is no less prey to fiction and hyperbole than the victim is prey to the noble. Natural 
science suddenly stands accused of being in thrall to the victim-language of resentment 
morality due to its uncritical embrace of the grounding “errors of reason” that slave morality 
ultimately uses to defeat the nobles by persuading them that they ought to feel accountable 
for being who they are. Science’s methods, its founding presuppositions, are here rendered 
  
 
 
akin to self-delusion. “Reason” is just as deluded, mythical and subterranean in its innermost 
workings as the unnatural reasoning which seeks to blame the strong for (“naturally”) being 
what they are. Science is no different from the “common” person who after seeing a lightning 
flash is inclined to attribute an agency behind it doing the deed. In this way, the violent 
excess of Nietzsche’s hyperbolic traversal makes manifest a hidden, “unnatural” violence of 
reason, no less than it has scandalously inverted conventional moral “prejudice” by 
celebrating “natural” noble excess. Here we are confronted with an exposure of the 
concealment and distortion involved in denying the original condition of violation that 
underlies morality and sovereignty alike. With this, we stand confronted by the paradoxical 
stance of a “violence-against-violence” that, for Nietzsche, typifies the most naïve faith in 
value-freedom and scientific objectivity. What is one to make of this exposure? 
 
4. Sovereignty, Instrumental Reason, and Colonial Power 
While the above account accords with Eugen Fink’s comment mentioned above, it also, in a 
provisional way at least, takes us beyond it in a manner that can be illuminated by a point 
made by Theodor Adorno in Minima Moralia. Nietzsche, Adorno comments, conducts his 
polemics in provocatively eccentric style, attacking like a horseman riding into battle on a 
charger mounted tail first.
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 As we have seen, even a relatively brief consideration of the 
Genealogy illustrates this eccentric reversal well enough. Imagery, exaggeration, and rhetoric 
drive apparently cool rational argument before them, threatening to permeate and overwhelm 
it. In so doing, Nietzsche reveals what argument from rational principles could not: 
Nietzsche’s text suspends uncritical belief in the neutrality of reason.  
For Adorno, the extremity involved in Nietzsche’s strategy is dictated by the critical 
demands he makes of himself as simultaneous accomplice and bad conscience of the most 
questionable tendency of Enlightenment thought. Nietzsche is caught within the historical 
  
 
 
moment of triumphant Enlightenment’s successful reduction of reason to a mere tool in its 
pursuit of the mastery of violently unreasonable nature, and he knows it. His response is to 
follow Enlightenment’s instrumentalizing trajectory ruthlessly and faithfully in equal 
measure, driving it to the point where any attempt to derive high moral principles and 
methods from rational precepts crumbles.
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 There are no rules, instrumental reason tells us, 
only the manipulation of conditions in the quest for control. Enlightenment lacks the self-
reflexivity to become aware of this. With Nietzsche Enlightenment is exposed to the 
implication of its own searing manipulative gaze: the moral limitations of modern reason are 
demonstrated by turning its strategic inclination back on itself by any possible means. The 
instrumental rhetorical tail which ought to be reason’s obedient servant and supplement 
suddenly appears to lead the methodologically rational head, dragging it helplessly through a 
thicket of images, metaphors and contentious evaluative claims. The aim of this, however, is 
not mere madness. Nietzsche’s achievement, for Adorno, is to sketch the potential for 
Enlightenment’s transformation of reason into unlimited violence by drawing out its 
consequence: an uncanny, topsy-turvy world that is by turns almost as comical as it is 
terrifying. 
One should bear in mind in this connection a clue offered in Nietzsche’s concluding 
poetic afterword to Human, All Too Human. In it he suggests that we would be well advised 
to understand that text as a “fool’s book,” that is, as a piece of eccentricity. Foolhardiness is 
the opposite of self-interested rational calculation. Only through such foolishness, Nietzsche 
tells us, is it possible to discover a path whereby “reason comes—‘to reason’!” (HH “Among 
Friends: An Epilogue”). In contrast to its occasional superficially positivistic garb,36 Human, 
All Too Human is in this way presented as a work that situates itself at the margins of 
respectable methodological society. It is through such a questionable situation that the text 
claims entitlement to reveal reason’s inherent unreasonableness. The reader is invited to bear 
  
 
 
witness to an inversion whereby, in a manner that prefigures the Genealogy’s overturning of 
the presuppositions of disinterested reason and the autonomy of the “rational” morally 
accountable subject, any confident affirmation of reason’s independent status as autonomous, 
objective judge of reality is pulled up short and unmasked as careless complacency. In so far 
as he thereby questions what has been celebrated as “reason,” Nietzsche finds himself obliged 
to take on the exaggerated guise of someone foolish, fanciful, and speculative. In other 
words, he must appear deeply unreasonable when regarded from the stern standpoint of strict 
and sober method. The extremity of Nietzsche’s gesture towards his own “foolishness” serves 
to puncture presuppositions: it urges suspicion of any viewpoint that sets objective, 
calculative reason over its opposite, unreason.
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The extent to which Nietzsche is prepared to engage in “unreasonable” behavior is 
captured well by Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Prefiguring 
Adorno’s comment in Minima Moralia, they argue that Nietzsche, like de Sade, refuses to 
suppress “the impossibility of deriving from reason a fundamental argument against murder,” 
but instead unashamedly shouts it out to the whole world.
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 With this point in mind, it is 
possible to grasp the outlandish, hyperbolic and naturalistically presented “celebration” of 
violence in the Genealogy to be indicative of something else—whatever Nietzsche’s 
supposed “intentions.” It indicates the condition of modern rationality ruminating on its own 
moral redundancy. Just as reason discloses the essential contingency of the world and hence 
its fundamental amorality, so Nietzsche’s self-avowed naturalistic “immoralism” discloses 
what reason has been obliged to sacrifice with this disclosure: it has sacrificed the right of 
reason itself to comment on right and wrong. Thus, reason, Nietzsche can comment with 
unnerving casualness in Beyond Good and Evil, “is only an instrument” (BGE 191).39 Like 
every instrument, reason should not to be confused with the realm to which its practical 
nature permits it to be efficiently related. It is, it follows, one thing to claim for rationality a 
  
 
 
specific (even positive) instrumental value (a facet of reason exploited by the sciences), but 
quite another to claim that this instrumental value sets the standard for value “as such,” and 
that one can thereby determine the “good” in terms amenable to instrumental reason’s 
“success.” Taken this way, Nietzsche’s violently hyperbolic narration of the origins of 
morality and sovereignty in the Genealogy enacts precisely what Horkheimer and Adorno 
indicate. Ethics and sovereign power (consequently, also legality) are not opposed; they are 
co-conspirators in the anguish that is an essential condition of “civilized” life.40 
What is challenged with this contention is nothing less than the integrity of 
philosophy itself, at least as hitherto understood. We “knowers,” Nietzsche says at the 
opening of the Genealogy (neither confirming nor denying whether any of his readers might 
actually be counted amongst this “we”41), “are unknown to ourselves” (GM P:1). The seeker 
of knowledge is, “with good reason” it turns out, not endowed with transparent self-
awareness. One either has one’s taste for knowledge or one does not. The task is constitutive 
of the identity of the one who desires knowledge such that he or she could not do (and hence 
be) otherwise. Like a honey-gathering insect driven to capture sweetness, like the noble 
lusting for conquest, the knower’s identity is realised in the pursuit of its goal. Nietzsche’s 
naturalistic imagery thereby fuses the worlds of thought and nature in the implied existence 
of an unrelenting search for sustenance as characterizing the “hungry” intellect. The intellect 
becomes a body. With this, the lover of wisdom is divested of his or her popular cultural garb 
as a creature of pure, untainted thought.
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 In this way, the naturalization Nietzsche 
continually deploys in the Genealogy also disrupts the standard portrayal of the “natural” 
condition of the philosophical mind as the bearer of reason through a life of unworldly 
reflection in pursuit of value-free objectivity no less than it disrupts conventional moral and 
political wisdom. The image of the knower is profoundly unnatural, perverse even, in its 
unashamedly inhuman invocation of an identity that is allied with a violence that, for all its 
  
 
 
subtlety, is of no lesser magnitude than the violence which will later in the text be attributed 
to the noble, or the violence of the natural scientist’s naïve attribution of an agency where 
there is none. The intellectual insect in pursuit of honeyed sweetness is, after all, no mere 
worker bee or drone, no member of a collective hive engaged in a common pursuit, but akin 
to an outsider and raider, one who seizes on the hives of knowledge it desires in order to 
plunder and take possession of what they offer. Nietzsche here, as in GM I:13, “naturalizes” 
and de-naturalizes at one and the same time as anthropomorphic imagery is used to expose 
other, hidden anthropomorphic illusions in hitherto unsuspected nooks and crannies of 
thought and value (“disinterestedness,” “pure” self-knowledge, and the like). 
Thought (not even—or perhaps especially—philosophical thought) is no more method 
than “naturalism” is ever straightforwardly natural. Naturalism of the order unleashed in the 
Genealogy does not seek to describe. More especially, it does not even pretend to emulate the 
good manners of “scientific,” value-free description. It is not “method.” It is lived. As such, 
Nietzsche’s naturalism is a rejection of the notion that ‘method’ should ultimately guide us. 
The “fundamental will to knowledge” which, in the Genealogy’s Preface, Nietzsche 
immediately allies with the “naturalized” knower when describing his own intellectual path 
makes this point forcefully enough. A real philosopher’s thoughts and values have “no right 
to stand out individually” but must spring from an inner demand: they must “grow from us 
with the same inevitability as fruits born on the tree,” irrespective of consideration as to 
whether or not others like such fruits (GM P:2). The path of thought must go its own way and 
must be content with the only comfort available to it: that in doing so, it remains faithful to 
itself.  The end product (in this case the text of the Genealogy) is what it is. It hangs as an 
eccentric and stubborn testimony of faithfulness to the “tree” that bore it. This, too, is 
“natural.” 
  
 
 
The Genealogy’s naturalizing hyperbole is thus much more complex in implication 
than a merely “methodological” conception would allow. Nietzsche’s extended naturalism is 
also and always already hyperbolic in the sense that its presentation of nature cannot be 
divorced from its imagistic and exaggerated mode of expression. Through the collision 
between nature and culture that this conjoining enacts the distinction between them is 
rendered ambiguous. Natural and cultural are revealed as not being different in kind in 
Nietzsche’s discourse: the boundaries that separate them are rendered porous. What really 
matters about Nietzsche’s naturalism, especially in the context of its relationship to the 
problem of morality, is hence not something that needs to established (or perhaps even can be 
established) by way of reference to how much or how little he may on this occasion or that 
have presented himself as extolling the virtues of the sciences or dressed himself in the guise 
of their critic.
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 Rather, the object of interest in addressing the question of naturalism should 
be Nietzsche’s practice. Consideration of Nietzsche’s practice in this context concerns the 
way in which he deploys naturalistic discourse and, above all, that discourse’s critical relation 
to the Enlightenment ethos it draws upon. 
This critical relation has a moral-political aspect: it engages with nothing less than the 
question of modernity’s legitimacy. If Adorno and Horkheimer offer an insight into the 
problematizing of instrumental reason that Nietzsche’s thought enacts through his practice of 
critical reflection on Enlightenment, Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer offers a plausible 
standpoint from which to extrapolate the political and moral implications of this 
problematization. Agamben’s thought engages directly with the issue of naturalization, in so 
far as he holds modern political discourse to be dominated by the consideration of life 
processes. Following Foucault’s lead,44 Agamben argues that in the Western tradition life 
(biological nature) is inexorably bound up with the political as such: domination over life (in 
the form of brute, “naked life”) is a defining characteristic of sovereignty. This tendency 
  
 
 
finds its fullest expression in modern society, where biology has come to subvert the place of 
the citizen as the locus of political talk and action.
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We can elaborate Agamben’s point about the body and life processes in terms that 
open up the possibility of a theoretical articulation of the political implications of Nietzsche’s 
hyperbolic naturalism. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche’s naturalistic narrative elaborates the 
constitutive role of sovereignty in political discourse such that the biological (“natural”) body 
(the unit of bio-political discourse) is exposed as an object amenable to critical reflection. 
However, he does this by what one must term “non-theoretical-critical”46 (that is, by 
exaggeratedly figurative and imagistic) means. In its portrayal of the noble in the 
“wilderness” as a being who exists beyond the law, joyfully hunting down the alien outsider, 
the Genealogy narrates in figural terms the emergence of the “human animal” from brute 
nature in a way that illustrates how the body is transformed into an object of sovereign 
domination—a mode of domination that is no longer that of communal norms but 
commanding state power. Nietzsche does not theorize this transformation methodologically, 
that is, he does not analyze and thereby say it explicitly by following the steps dictated by 
rigidly rule-like procedures to arrive at a conclusion. Rather, he portrays it: Nietzsche does 
not say it, he shows it. Through this act of showing, the political (understood as the lived-in 
space which emerges only with the fashioning of the state) is revealed as a moment of violent 
subjugation of largely unformed and pliant ‘natural’ bodies. Just as communal violence 
underlies the emergence of the primitive promising animal depicted in the opening sections 
of the Genealogy’s second essay, so later the founding of the state within that account (GM 
II:13) is portrayed vividly as an act of enclosure in which one set of primitive promisers 
closes in on and surrounds another: violent and powerful nobility encloses its victims within 
an organized web of power. 
  
 
 
Such enclosure signals the forced transformation of rudimentary normative humanity 
from a communal and customary entity to a being of sociality dwelling in the rigidly rule-like 
domain of the state. Here, in the image of domination, Nietzsche stakes a claim to reveal the 
nature of state power, law, formalized notions of moral duty, and thus the terrain of the 
political itself. Sovereignty appears in Nietzsche’s text in a manner that does not so much 
prefigure Agamben’s account as threaten to outstrip it. Sovereign power (the power of 
command that organizes individuated communal bodies into social bodies) is constituted 
through the organized incarceration and shaping of potentiality (the primitively customary 
human community) into socialized, organized actuality. Understood in this way, Nietzsche’s 
deliberately visceral naturalism can be read not as mere rhetoric surrounding a theoretical 
core, nor as merely as performing an inversion of the Western tradition’s privileging of 
reason over sensibility, but as enacting and thereby exposing the moral-bio-political 
implication concealed within the opposition that separates reason from embodiment, method 
from practice, instrument from aim and value. 
Nietzsche’s naturalizing narrative in this way forces us to consider the possibility that 
a specific kind of violation (that of incarceration) is productive of the sensibility that is 
amenable to what is commonly called “political reason” or reason of state. This sensibility, 
one symptom of which is the self-reflexive sense of shame called “bad conscience,” 
exemplifies the condition of a propensity to “inner” reflection that is necessary in order for an 
ordering and organizing sovereign reason to exert its power. In other words, reason, for the 
socialized animal that has been battered and tyrannized into the condition of moral-political 
existence, is always already reason of state, i.e. the belief that there is such a thing as a 
national identity and interest represented by the image of the sovereign. In feudal society, this 
image centers on the monarch as the representative of order. In the modern era it is reiterated 
as the representative governmental administration, which claims the right to dictate a nation 
  
 
 
state’s assumed political, economic, cultural, and social goals, its friends and enemies. 
Questions of political reason are thereby always already framed within the instrumentally 
fashioned enclosure of state power and the brutal forging of selfhood that is presupposes. Bad 
conscience is, in this regard, akin to a kind of scar that testifies to the presence of an 
inaugural moral violation lurking within the political.
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The second essay of the Genealogy informs us that this violence is doubled on itself. 
It is worth recalling here that the most primitive human community, Nietzsche argues, 
emerges as a community of promisers (GM II:1 and 9). Every community of promisers 
inhabits a world of traditional, customary morality. In the nobles’ barbaric pursuit of those 
from alien communities and, ultimately, in one community’s falling prey to another’s noble 
tyranny, the violence of one moral form is visited on the other as the sinister promise of 
politics. The promiser-victim has no choice when faced with the promiser-noble’s threat: 
accede to domination or else become naked life and risk being killed with impunity. A 
doubled promise thereby encircles the victim as their own (now threatened) customary world 
meets the custom and tradition of the stranger who is more powerful. It is only in virtue of 
this doubling that the victim is encircled “within” the boundaries of rudimentary political 
society. Nietzsche’s elaborate and imagistic story-telling has thereby rendered sovereignty 
open to being thought of as a seizing, instrumental incorporation and putting to use of brute 
“alien” resources. Is it necessary to point out that this kind of incarceration is paradigmatic 
not merely of the camp but of the imperial colonization that characterized the emergence of 
political modernity? The state, which is for liberalism the paradigm of neutrality, the 
disinterested arbitrator contracted to negotiate between the interests of individual disputants, 
is rendered by Nietzsche an instrumental structure and façade of colonial power. 
However eccentric the means, Nietzsche’s exposure of the state as a façade affirms 
his place as a thinker in whom the collusion of ethics and political power is exposed as bio-
  
 
 
politics. This exposure is made by naturalistic means, in so far as its springs from Nietzsche’s 
picturing of a world in vividly and figuratively “naturalized” terms. What Nietzsche does 
thereby is to show something that cannot (initially) be said. He extrapolates the dark 
implications of naturalism by stepping beyond the boundaries of the possibilities of what can 
be identified, theorized and said from within the confines of “method,” in order to create 
something new for conceptual thought to wonder at by showing it. The image of “natural” 
violence proffered in the Genealogy coagulates into a perspective according to which the 
nation state is seen to originate in the specific violence and violation of colonization. In this 
way, it drives us toward the acknowledgement and subsequent attempt at a theoretical saying 
of this perspective. Nietzsche’s thought suggests that “natural,” naked life is not a given 
material of political manipulation but, rather, is what is produced through seizure and 
possession. The “natural” is a construct and this construct is the enabling condition of 
politics. 
The victim, ironically perhaps given Nietzsche’s overtly ambivalent celebration of the 
victimizer, is in this way thrust to the fore as a central moral-political-biological category. In 
the victim, biology, morality, and politics meet up in such a way as to reveal that only 
through this meeting do they become what they are. Biology, in this sense, is a kind of 
historical text scarred with its heritage of moral and political practices.  Morality is the 
scarring of the body, politics the body’s subjugation to a centralized order of command. A 
victim, it follows, never approaches sovereignty by stepping out of a Lockean-style “state of 
nature” as a fully- formed “individual” endowed with self-interested rational traits in order to 
have his or her “natural rights” upheld in the face of disputes. He or she does not stand before 
state power as a contracting proto-citizen. The image of the individuated political subject, as 
Nietzsche presents it, is of a being standing before overwhelming domination, bloodied, 
  
 
 
battered, replete with self-loathing, but endowed with a sense of selfhood and hence an image 
of the articulate “disanimalized” being of culture and history. 
Nietzsche’s disturbingly celebratory portrayal of this violence in a welter of image 
and assertion may seem devoid of pity. But to the extent that his naturalistic exposure of 
colonizing power is an exposure it provokes critical reflection and elaboration of what it 
shows of the stony world of brute power. It brings the question of politics as violation rather 
than consent to the fore. In doing so, Nietzsche’s thought drives us to question the legitimacy 
of conventionally accepted discourses concerning sovereignty and power. As Horkheimer 
and Adorno comment, in his proclamation of “the identity of power and reason,” Nietzsche 
may appear without compassion, but his is nevertheless a standpoint “more compassionate 
than those of the moral lackeys of the bourgeoisie” who would like to subordinate reason to 
domination by scraping around for “good” “scientific” reasons to justify it.48 Taken this way, 
the task of reading Nietzsche’s naturalism poses a political challenge. His hyperbole proffers 
a path to speculating on new and sympathetic imagistic imaginings of the political and moral 
status of a compassion for the body that is capable of transcending the contractarian liberal 
political discourse of sovereignty which he so rightly scorns. 
 
5. Biopolitical Nietzsche 
Biopolitics, Agamben argues, characterizes politics as such. It is rooted in the tension that 
inheres in the Western tradition between the way in which the notions of zoē and bios are 
figured in relation to one another. Zoē, the mere “fact of living,”49 denotes the element of 
animality that is necessarily incorporated into all forms of political existence. Bios, which is 
“the way of living proper to an individual or group,” signifies the specifically “human” 
dimension of social life wherein political existence as such (i.e. existence in a state) is lived. 
Whenever statehood is withdrawn from the individual, zoē re-manifests itself as bare or 
  
 
 
naked life. The person beyond the law is reduced to being a mere living entity that has been 
stripped of politico-biographical content and transformed into something akin to a zoological 
specimen consisting of skin and bones. Politics, Agamben holds, exists “because man is the 
living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the 
same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.”50 The 
Western tradition of political organization, in other words, springs from a “fundamental 
categorial” dichotomy through which social life is conceptualized by way of the threat of its 
removal and the ensuing condition of privation characteristic of one who, having been 
expelled by sovereign power from legal society can, in consequence, be killed with 
impunity.
51
 The dangerous consequences of the political erupt as bios falls prey to the 
possibility of becoming divided against itself at the hands of tyrannical sovereignty. The 
victim of this division is denuded of his or her status as a legal person and left as a mere 
remnant of zoē, as is exemplified by the victim of a death camp. 
In elucidating his critique, Agamben invites us to think beyond this model. At the 
same time, he points to Nietzsche as one of the thinkers who might allow us to “think a 
constituting power wholly released from the sovereign ban.”52 Tellingly, perhaps, this 
possibility concerning Nietzsche is never fulfilled in Agamben’s text. This is perhaps because 
Nietzsche’s rethinking of the political does not turn on the tension between zoē and bios in 
the same way as Agamben’s does. In Nietzsche, the biopolitical is already laid bare, so to 
speak; but it is exposed in a manner that might lead us to question aspects of Agamben’s 
theorization of it. As has already been argued, what characterizes Nietzsche’s exaggeratedly 
“naturalistic” portrayal of the emergence of the state, sovereignty and politics is colonization. 
The noble conquest of another population gives rise to the state. Contrary to Agamben, one 
might say that for Nietzsche the political does not simply emerge when the animality of zoē, 
once incorporated into the sociality of bios, is subjected to the threat of expulsion and 
  
 
 
reduction to the mode of brute existence characteristic of “naked life.” In Nietzsche’s 
depiction, the political erupts when incommensurable forms of bios meet in a clash of zoē, 
i.e. when a colonizer encounters and then subjugates the colonized. The political, in other 
words, does not turn on zoē’s relation to bios so much as on the fact that different communal 
identities and normative structures become entangled with one another so as to constitute a 
field of conflict. Politics, on such a view, presupposes not merely the biopolitical subjection 
of animality to sovereign authority outlined by Agamben, but also the supplanting of one 
kind of authority characteristic of bios (that of a community’s customs and traditions) by the 
imposition of an external form of subjection by one population on another (GM II:17). It is 
important to note that only with this moment is the condition of intellectuality and 
personhood characteristic of the “human animal” rendered possible through what Nietzsche 
here calls the “internalization of man” (GM II:17). Internalization occurs because the 
primitive communal being who is suddenly subjected to the irresistible will of another is 
obliged to seek alternative means of satisfying his or her conjoined customary and natural 
dispositions. Unable to express themselves outwardly, these dispositions turn back in on the 
primitive self, giving rise to imagination and creative thought.
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 Only with internalization 
does the self-reflexive subject necessary for politics emerge. Primitive pre-political humanity, 
on this view, is thus already a form of bios that has been articulated from zoē, in so far as 
such communal beings live according to dictates stipulated by customary normative 
conditions that are nevertheless devoid of sovereignty. With colonial invasion, however, the 
zoē of one form of bios, in the form of a violent animality that glories in temporary release 
from the constraints of the social bond, gets turned against another form of bios. The state 
crystallizes out of the threat of a reduction of one form of bios to mere zoē at the hands of 
another and, at the same time, this threat gives rise to political self-understanding through 
internalization. The political, it follows, has conflict underwritten into it, since the state and 
  
 
 
formalized law emerge as instruments of domination with which to contain the subjugated 
victim that, through this act of containment, becomes a political subject. All struggles of the 
subject, it follows, are political struggles in this sense. 
This suggests that for Nietzsche politics is not only always already biopolitics but that 
biopolitics, in turn, is always already cultural politics in so far as the political category of the 
state springs from the colonial conflict that arises when distinctive communities endowed 
with incompatible normative characteristics meet. Biopolitics, in this regard, presupposes a 
primitive cultural plurality that is subsequently subordinated by an instrumentally organized 
sovereign order. With this insight, Nietzsche’s hyperbolic thinking is revealed not only as 
having an underestimated significance for how we ought to make sense of his naturalism and 
his approach to the questions of method and rationality. His form of disruptive and 
exaggerated naturalism also invites a re-theorization of the biopolitical that takes us beyond 
Agamben’s conceptualization of the relation between zoē and bios. It is with this re-
theorization that Nietzsche offers the possibility of a radical rethinking of the legitimacy of 
the liberal state in modern social orders. Above all, when interpreted in this way, his thought 
can be used to pose the question of whether a liberal politics that endorses a conception of the 
state as disinterested arbitrator between disputants can ever adequately encompass the 
potential violence that can be unleashed through the tension between the biopolitical and 
administrative aspirations of governmental forms of power and global cultural diversity.
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